

Institutional rules, labour demand and disability programme participation*

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Abstract

We use matched employer-employee data from Finland to model transitions out of work into sick leave and disability retirement. To identify the role of institutional factors we exploit a law change that made the medical requirements for disability pension eligibility tougher for a certain group, as well as partially experience-rated employer contributions that vary with the firm size. We find evidence that employers exploit disability retirement as a way of adjusting their workforce at times when dismissals are difficult to justify. We also show that the transition rate to disability retirement depends on the stringency of medical screening and the degree of experience rating applied to the employer.

Keywords: Disability pension, sickness benefits, early retirement, experience rating, labour demand.

JEL-codes: J14, J23, J26.

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1 Introduction

The disability benefit scheme is one of the largest social security programmes in many countries and therefore of particular interest. In Finland, disability is the most common reason for early retirement, and disability expenditure accounted for some 3.5% of GDP in 2003, which was the third highest share in the EU after Sweden and Denmark (Börsch-Supan, 2007). Disability enrolment rates of older employees vary strikingly across the European countries and the US. These cross-country differences cannot be explained by demographic or health-related factors, but are attributable to institutional differences in the disability schemes (Börsch-Supan, 2007). During the past two or three decades, many countries have also experienced an expansion of disability benefit enrolment. This is a serious concern given the common goal to induce people to retire later. The widespread use of disability benefits as an early retirement instrument has been argued to be a particularly serious problem in Finland (e.g. OECD, 2008).

Disability benefits are designed to provide insurance for employees' labour income against the risk of becoming disabled and incapable of regular work. In practice, it may be difficult to identify employees who are truly disabled, which suggests the possibility that disability benefits can distort labour supply and demand in some cases. Autor and Duggan (2003, 2006), for example, argue that rapid growth in disability benefit rolls in the US cannot be explained by changes in health, but is driven by a combination of labour demand conditions and changes in the disability scheme itself (in terms of generosity, coverage, and screening intensity). Other authors have also found evidence of the importance of the generosity of disability benefits, the stringency of medical screening, and the economic environment when explaining participation in disability programmes (e.g. Gruber, 2000, Black *et al.*, 2002, Campolieti, 2004). A majority of this literature has been motivated by a simple labour supply framework, in which an employee chooses whether to apply for disability benefits, while the employer has no role at all. Surprisingly little effort has been made to study the labour demand side (some exceptions are Hassink *et al.*, 1997, and Koning, 2005).

When employment reductions are necessary, firms often get rid of their oldest employees first. If health requirements for disability benefit eligibility are weak, early retirement via the disability scheme can be a useful strategy in effective downsizing. For both the employer and employee, disability retirement can be a more attractive way of terminating the employment relationship than a dismissal. Early retirees avoid the stigma attached to being unemployed and may suffer from smaller income losses, whereas the employer is able to reduce workforce in a "soft" way. Encouraging disability retirement can even be a more attractive strategy for an employer that wants to change the composition of the workforce during an expansion period when dismissals are difficult to justify. Moreover, the employer and employee do not typically bear the full cost of early retirement, suggesting that the early retirement benefits serve as a subsidy for early withdrawal from the labour market (Hutchens, 1999).

This study aims to shed some light on the relationships between labour demand, institutional factors and disability retirement. We consider the importance of the labour demand side by examining the relationship between the establishment's growth and re-

structuring rates and its employees' disability entries. In addition, we assess the effectiveness of two policy instruments: the strictness of medical requirements for disability pension eligibility and the experience rating of disability expenditures. Using matched employer-employee data from Finland, we model transitions out of work into sick leave and disability retirement. To identify the role of institutional factors we exploit a law change that made the medical requirements for disability pension eligibility tougher for a certain group, as well as partially experience-rated employer contributions that vary with the firm size. We find some evidence that employers exploit disability retirement as a way of adjusting their workforce when not downsizing. We also show that the transition rate to disability retirement depends on the stringency of medical screening and the degree of experience rating applied to the employer.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we give a short overview of the existing literature. Section 3 describes the Finnish social security system for sickness benefits and disability pensions. We discuss our data and report descriptive statistics in section 4. The results of our econometric analyses are reported and discussed in section 5, which is followed by a concluding section.

2 Related literature

Disability benefits are typically determined as a function of past earnings, which are likely to be correlated with the employee's preferences for work. The resulting endogeneity problem has hampered attempts to quantify the impact of disability benefits on labour supply. Gruber (2000) and Campolieti (2004) overcome the endogeneity problem by exploiting policy changes in the Canadian disability benefit scheme that had differential effects on people living in different parts of the country. While Gruber estimates that the elasticity of nonparticipation with respect to disability insurance benefits is between 0.28–0.36, Campolieti finds no statistically significant relationship. In the late 1980s, which is the period analyzed by Gruber, nonmedical factors related to the availability of suitable jobs in the region and personal skills were taken into consideration when determining benefit eligibility. Campolieti considers an earlier reform that took place in the early 1970s when the eligibility requirements and the stringency of medical screening were tougher. This led Campolieti to argue that the generosity of the disability benefits may not distort working decisions when it is difficult to qualify for such benefits because of a strict screening process.

Using aggregate data for the US, Black *et al.* (2002) and Autor and Duggan (2003, 2006) find evidence of the relationship between disability participation and business cycle conditions. Black *et al.* use data from the coal boom and bust in the 1970s and 1980s, which affected only a few coal-producing counties, to construct instrumental variables for local labour market shocks. According to their county-level analysis, participation in disability programmes falls during economic upturns, and this relationship is much stronger for permanent than for transitory economic shocks. Autor and Duggan discuss a dramatic expansion of disability insurance enrolment during the past two decades in

the US.¹ They argue that this growth cannot be explained by a true increase in the incidence of disabling illness. Instead, they claim that the reduced stringency of the screening for disability benefits after 1984, an increase in the earnings replacement rate, and an increase in female labour force participation have played important roles. As a result of the liberalization of disability benefits in 1984, the disability application rates were found to become more responsive to adverse labour demand shocks. This result supports Campolieti's (2004) interpretation of Canadian evidence. Autor and Duggan (2003) estimate that the unemployment rate of workers aged 25–64 in 1998 was a half percentage point lower than it would have been otherwise. They argue that the US disability system has begun to "function much like a long-term unemployment insurance program for the unemployable" (Autor and Duggan 2006, p. 74).

Unlike the US studies based on aggregate data, Vahtera *et al.* (2005) and Rege *et al.* (in press) analyze individual-specific disability risks. Using matched employer-employee data for Norway, Rege *et al.* explain the likelihood of being on a disability pension with dummy variables indicating various degrees of plant downsizing during the past six years. They find a substantial increase in the transition rate to disability retirement following plant downsizing or plant closure.² Whereas Rege *et al.* do not make a distinction between those who kept their jobs and those who lost their jobs in plant downsizing, Vahtera *et al.* consider a risk of disability retirement among Finnish municipal employees who kept their jobs after the reduction of personnel in their organisation. These employment reductions were carried out between 1991 and 1993, during a period of severe recession in Finland. They found an almost twofold risk of being granted a permanent disability pension in the next five years after a major downsizing (more than 18% reduction in the personnel) than after no downsizing (less than 8% reduction). Thus, not only employees who lose their jobs, but also those who keep their jobs after the employment reduction are subject to an increased disability risk.

Börsch-Supan (2007) points out that disability expenditures and enrolment rates vary notably across different countries. In Europe, disability expenditures are highest in Finland, Sweden and Denmark.³ Börsch-Supan analyzes the cross-country differences in the disability enrolment rates of people aged 50 to 65 years, using harmonized survey data for 12 European countries and similar survey data for the UK and US. He finds very little explanatory power for demographic and health-related differences across the countries. By contrast, three quarters of the cross-country variation were explained by the institutional variables that describe the generosity and the ease of access of disability insurance. The most influential institutional factor turned out to be the strictness by which vocational considerations are applied when determining eligibility.

The studies discussed above do not pay much attention to the employer's role. Hutchens

¹See McVicar (2008) for discussion about the growth in disability benefit rolls in the UK.

²They also find an increase in mortality rates among workers whose plants downsized.

³Disability schemes represent only a part of the social security system. How people who are unable, or unwilling, to work are allocated between sickness, unemployment, disability, and early retirement schemes depends on relative compensation levels and eligibility criteria, which vary from country to country. Hence, a low disability enrolment rate may be associated with a high rate of sickness absence, long-term unemployment or voluntary early retirement. This kind of spillovers should be kept in mind when interpreting the results from cross-country comparisons.

(1999) develops a theoretical framework that helps to understand why employers may be actively involved in early retirement decisions. He introduces an implicit contract model of a firm that uses early retirement benefits, provided by the government, as a form of unemployment insurance. Within this framework, the public early retirement benefits effectively subsidize workforce reductions. Therefore, the firm responds to slack demand by encouraging early retirement, which leads to an inefficiently high level of early retirements. Hutchens also discusses two alternative policies: actuarial adjustments and experience rating. An actuarial adjustment places costs on early retirees by reducing their future benefits compared to the case where retirement occurs at a later day, whereas experience rating places costs on firms by directing part of the early retirement expenditure to the former employer. While both of these policies can be used to reduce the implicit subsidy, and thereby restore early retirement to the efficient level, their implementation is subject to some practical drawbacks. Namely, an effective early retirement scheme should vary with individual characteristics, like wages and survival probabilities. Since the real-world scheme cannot account for all individual heterogeneity, the implicit subsidy will exist at least for some groups even if the scheme eliminates the subsidy "on average".

Theoretical insights of Hutchens (1999) are supported by empirical findings of two studies for the Netherlands. Using data on the dismissal and disability rates of Dutch firms, Hassink *et al.* (1997) examine to what extent separations into disability are used as an alternative to dismissals. They estimate that about one-tenth of the observed inflow into disability were effectively dismissals. The data used by Hassink *et al.* covered the years 1988 and 1990 when the experience rating of disability benefits was not yet introduced in the Netherlands. In the later years, the Dutch employers have been fully responsible for sickness benefit costs and partly responsible for the cost of disability insurance benefits collected by their former employees via an experience rating system. Koning (2005) finds evidence that the experience rating system decreases the flow into disability benefits within firms.

In sum, we can draw the following lessons from the existing literature: 1) the generosity of disability compensation and negative demand shocks increase the entry rates to disability benefit schemes, 2) the strength of this relationship depends on the stringency of medical screening, and 3) the experience rating of disability benefit costs can be used to reduce the moral hazard problem. Our study complements this literature. In addition to studying transitions from work to disability retirement, we also consider transitions from work to sick leave and from sick leave to disability retirement. In this way, we can differentiate between factors affecting the incidence of sickness or injury (*ex ante* effects) and those affecting the intensity or success of medical and occupational rehabilitation (*ex post* effects). This distinction helps us to detect the point in the disability pension track when certain policy instruments are effective. When analyzing the role of labour demand, we pay particular attention to excess worker turnover, which describes a degree of restructuring for a given employment change. This helps us to show that disability benefits are not used as a downsizing instrument, but to adjust the structure of the workforce at the times of stable or growing employment when dismissals would be difficult to use. Finally, by accounting for a firm's financial position, we show that experience rating has a heterogeneous effect, being less effective for those employers that can easily incur their share of

the disability pension costs.

3 Institutional framework for Finland

The Finnish social security system has been subject to continuous changes over time. Below we describe the features of the system that were in force from the mid-1990s until 2004, which is the time period covered by our empirical analysis.

3.1 Sickness and disability benefits

An employee who is unable to perform his job due to illness or injury is entitled to compensation for income losses. The applicant needs a statement by a doctor or hospital certifying that he or she is not capable of work. For the first ten working days the applicant is fully compensated by the employer, after which he can claim a *sickness benefit* from the Social Insurance Institution (KELA). Depending on the collective labour agreement, many employers continue to pay wages or salary after the mandatory waiting period of ten working days, in which case the allowance is paid to the employer. As a result, the time out of work until receipt of a sickness benefit directly from the Social Insurance Institution is typically one to three months. The sickness benefit is determined by the past taxable earnings, and it can be received for a maximum of about one year (300 working days, Saturdays included). Depending on illness or disability, the applicant's rehabilitation needs and possibilities are assessed in a more extensive medical examination during the sickness benefit period. In case of a prolonged illness or permanent disability, the employee can apply for a disability pension.

An *ordinary disability (OD) pension* is payable to individuals aged 16 to 64 whose working capacity has significantly decreased. A full benefit is conditional on the working capacity loss of at least 60% and a partial benefit for a loss of 40 to 59%. When determining eligibility, an individual's capability to support him/herself by regular work, age, education, occupation, and place of residence are taken into account along with the medical assessment. The OD pension can be granted either indefinitely (if return to work is not likely) or for a specific period. In the latter case, the OD pension is also referred to as a rehabilitation subsidy or a cash rehabilitation benefit, and its receipt is conditional on a rehabilitation plan. An OD pension may be discontinued if the working capacity of the recipient improves, but this rarely happens among older recipients (e.g. OECD, 2008, p. 116). There is no automatic retesting of the disability status except for new periods of the rehabilitation subsidy.

An *individual early retirement (IER) pension* is another disability pension which is available for employees who have a long working career and are unable to continue in their current job because of deteriorated health. Compared with the OD pension, eligibility for the IER pension is subject to less strict medical criteria. The minimum degree of working incapacity is not defined, and occupational factors like the length of service and working conditions carry greater weight. It suffices that working capacity has reduced to such an extent that the person cannot continue in his or her present job or occupation, so that other working possibilities are not considered. Unlike the OD pension however, the IER

pension is payable only to employees above a certain age threshold. In the private sector, there was a uniform age threshold of 58 until 1999. For people born in 1944 or later it was raised to 60 in 2000 and subsequently abolished entirely in 2004. At the same time the medical criteria for OD pension eligibility were somewhat relaxed for people aged 60 and over.

Saurama (2004) provides some survey evidence that bad health is not the only reason for entering into a disability pension in Finland.⁴ As expected, disability pensioners reported bad health as one of the main reasons for retirement, but many of them said that straining work played an important role as well. In particular, 62% of OD pensioners and 74% of IER pensioners had felt that their job had become too exhausting or they could not handle their job any more. A notable fraction of the respondents had also felt pressure to retire from the management or colleagues: 14% of OD pensioners and 24% of IER pensioners were partly forced out of their job. Hence, difficulties in performing job tasks and the pressure from the workplace are important factors affecting disability pension entry.

The purpose of the gradual abolition of the IER pension in 2000 and 2004 was to reduce the disability enrolment rates at higher ages. This reform made the medical requirements for disability pension eligibility tougher for the younger cohorts who have been able to apply only for the OD pension, and thereby should reduce the flow into disability pension benefits among those who are not truly disabled. Because only those employees born after 1943 were affected, the reform provides us with a quasi-experimental setting for studying the importance of the stringency of medical screening.

3.2 Experience rating of disability pension benefits

A particular feature of the Finnish disability scheme is that employers are liable for disability pension expenditures via partially experience-rated employer contributions. Experience rating is not applied to firms with fewer than 50 employees, but larger firms have to pay a given proportion of the disability pension benefit stream received by their former employees. This cost share is determined as a linear function of firm size. It increases with firm size from 0% (fewer than 50 employees) to 80% (over 800 employees). Until 1999 the cost share continued to increase up to 100%, which was applied to firms with over 1000 employees. Disability pension costs incurred by the employer can accumulate over several years until the former employee reaches the age of 65 and transfers to an old-age pension. Hence, disability retirement can become very costly for the former employer, especially in the case of a large firm. Moreover, the employer must pay its share of the expected future costs as a lump sum payment at the time when a disability pension is granted to its employee.

The aim of experience rating is to minimize the employer's moral hazard problem by placing costs on those firms whose employees enter the disability pension schemes. When an employee applies for a disability pension, the employer has no direct control

⁴The target population of the survey was all people who received early retirement benefits at the end of 1998. The early retirees were asked for their reasons of retiring. The response rate was quite low – only 51.3% – and young disability pensioners were under-represented. The numbers referred to in the text were taken from table 12 in Saurama (2004, p. 132).

over the decision made by the pension institution. Nevertheless, the employer has the means to indirectly affect the flow into sick leave and the likelihood that recipients of sickness benefits will return to work rather than retire via a disability pension scheme. If effective, experience rating should induce the employer to take preventive measures to minimize the flow into sick leave (the *ex ante* effect), as well as to put effort into getting its employees back to work from sick leave (the *ex post* effect). The preventive action may involve reallocation of the workload to minimize stress-related illness and arrangements that reduce accidents at the workplace. When helping people come back to work from sick leave, occupational rehabilitation and job modifications that allow the switching of jobs within the firm are crucial for those who cannot perform their old tasks despite medical rehabilitation.

There is hardly any empirical evidence on the consequences of the experience rating on the incidence of disability retirement (Koning, 2005, is an exception). This is because disability pension expenditures are subject to experience rating only in a few countries. Still, the topic should be of considerable interest as many countries suffer from high and still growing rates of disability programme participation. We extend Koning's (2005) work by differentiating between the *ex post* and *ex ante* effects of experience rating and by studying how the effectiveness of experience rating depends on the firm's financial position.

4 Data and descriptive evidence

4.1 Data

Our data set is drawn from the records of the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Database (FLEED). Employee information in the database has been obtained by merging information from over 20 administrative registers with unique personal identity numbers. The database covers effectively everyone with permanent residence in Finland. Along with standard socio-demographic background variables, the database includes detailed information on annual income (from the tax authorities), job spells (from the pension institutes), unemployment spells and participation in labour market programmes (from the employment offices). For people who are employed in the last week of a given year, the ES database also includes the unique identification code of the firm and establishment. This allows us to identify individuals who are working for the same employer and provides a link to firm records. Thus we are able to measure labour turnover and employment changes at establishment and firm levels.

The principal source of firm records in the FLEED is the Financial Statements Statistics (FSS), which is an annual survey conducted by Statistics Finland. The survey contains corporate income statement and balance sheet data on firms in manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale trade, business services, hotel and restaurant services, and transportation. Since 1994, all firms above a certain size threshold, which varies between the sectors, have been included in the survey. These data have been complemented by adding firm records from the Business Tax Register with more limited information content but covering all firms in all industries. As a result, the FLEED includes information on the universe of the private-sector firms over the period 1994–2004, which we use to

construct measures for firms' financial position.

Some key variables in the employee data contain information on sickness benefits, paid by KELA during the year, and on the types of pension benefits received at the last week of the year. These are used to detect transitions into sick leave and disability retirement. As discussed above, employees on sick leave are fully compensated by their employers for the first ten days to three months, depending on the collective labour agreement under which they are employed. Hence, receipt of sickness benefits directly from KELA indicates a prolonged illness.

We can distinguish between OD and IER pension benefits, but we do not know the compensation level (partial or full benefit), nor whether a disability pension was granted indefinitely or for a specific period. We classify an employee as being on a disability pension if he or she received either OD or IER pension benefits at the last week of the year.

4.2 Incidence of disability retirement

We begin by considering the extent of the disability problem in Finland. While the official retirement age was 65 until 2005,⁵ the effective retirement age – the average age of new pensioners – has been around 60 due to early retirement schemes, of which the disability schemes are the most important ones. In 2007 a roughly equal number of new pensioners were granted a disability pension and an old-age pension, but a few years earlier the disability pension was the most common reason for retiring. This explains why disability expenditures are so high in Finland compared with other industrialized countries.

A high incidence of disability is illustrated in figure 1 where the disability enrolment rates (including both OD and IER pension recipients) are shown as a function of age for four birth cohorts by sex.⁶ Within all birth cohorts, women have lower enrolment rates at each age. Compared with the later cohorts, employees born in 1940 are more likely to be disabled at all ages. Close to 30% of this cohort were on a disability pension at age 60, which is a strikingly large figure. There are no notable differences in disability rates at a given age between the 1945, 1950 and 1955 cohorts. The lower disability rates for these cohorts may to some extent be related to their ineligibility for the IER pension scheme.

4.3 Outcome variables for analysis of transitions

We distinguish the likelihood of entering into sick leave, which often means only temporary absence from work, from the likelihood of being granted a disability pension, which almost surely means a permanent withdrawal from the labour market. The determinants of these events can differ and be affected by experience rating in different ways. Hence, we shall model transitions from work to a disability pension, from work to sick leave, and from sick leave to a disability pension.

⁵The ordinary old-age pension was available for people older than 61 but only those entering at age 65 received the full benefits. Since 2005, employees have been able to choose freely at which age between 63 and 68 they begin to collect the old-age pension benefits.

⁶Statistics Finland changed its procedure of merging register data on pension benefits in 1995. This led to an unexplained (small) drop in the number of disability pension recipients in the FLEED for that year, reflecting some technical problems. For that reason we chose to break the time series in 1995.




Figure 1: Population share of disability pensioners by birth year (*Source*: Authors' calculations from the FLEED. *Note*: Numbers for 1995 are not shown due to data errors)

In all of our models the risk set in year t includes employees who (*i*) were 55 to 62 years old at the end of year $t - 1$, (*ii*) held a job at the end of year $t - 1$ in a private-sector firm with at least five employees, (*iii*) had been working, without receiving any pension benefits, at least for three consecutive years (i.e. from the beginning of year $t - 3$ until the end of year $t - 1$),⁷ and (*iv*) did not receive sickness benefits during year $t - 1$.⁸ We exclude the younger and older employees because their transitions into disability retirement are very rare. Moreover, for younger employees it is probably very difficult to be granted a disability pension without serious injury or illness, whereas the older employees can retire via other early retirement schemes, suggesting that the misuse of the disability pension schemes is not a serious issue for these groups. We also exclude employees from firms with less than five employees, as the data on very small firms is noisy.

Transitions to disability pension. Because receipt of a disability pension typically follows a sick leave and/or rehabilitation measures, there is a gap between the job withdrawal, which is of our primary interest, and actual entry into disability pension benefits. To detect the year when the process towards disability retirement started, we follow each person at risk in year t for the next three years (two years from 2002). The employee

⁷The cost of a disability pension is borne by the former employer (according to the experience-rating rules concerning firm size) only when the employment relationship has lasted for a minimum of three years. We also include workers who changed their jobs within the three-year period but control for job tenure in the probability models. Excluding these workers from the analysis does not notably affect our results.

⁸Our results for transitions from work to disability retirement are not sensitive with respect to this restriction. We exclude those on sickness benefit in year $t - 1$ to be able to analyze also the entry rate into sick leave.




Figure 2: Examples of labour market histories for persons at risk in year t

is classified as becoming disabled in year t if her or his working career was interrupted during that year and he or she was granted a disability pension by the end of year $t + 2$, without being unemployed or employed in the another firm in the meantime. That is, we are interested in transitions from a given workplace to disability retirement, but allow for periods of sick leave and rehabilitation between these two events. The majority of disability pensions following job withdrawal in year t are granted during year t (35%) or $t + 1$ (57%), while the number of entries into disability retirement drops sharply in year $t + 2$. A few pensions are also granted at the later periods but we think that assigning them to the employer at the end of year $t - 1$ is too unreliable and hence we discard those cases.

Transitions to sick leave. Receipt of an OD pension typically follows a one-year period on sickness benefits, and therefore almost all OD pensioners have been on sick leave before retiring. However, some employees have retired directly via the IER scheme without being on sickness benefits first. Since deteriorated health is a prerequisite for receipt of an IER pension as well, also these employees are classified as entering a sick leave in the year when the pension was granted. Thus, an employee at risk in year t moves into a sick leave during that year if she or he started to collect sickness benefits or was granted a disability pension during year t even without actually receiving sickness benefits.

Transitions from sick leave to disability pension. When modelling the likelihood of being granted a disability pension conditional on being on sickness benefits, the risk set in year t includes only those employees who started to collect sickness benefits during year t , including also those who were granted a disability pension without a period of sick leave.

Illustration. Four possible labour histories are shown in figure 2. Each of these persons is at risk of making a transition to disability retirement and to sick leave in year t . Employees A, B and C withdrew from work in year t and were granted a disability pension by the end of year $t + 2$. According to our definition, they made a transition from work to disability retirement in year t ($D_t = 1$). Since employees A and D received sickness benefits and employee C started to collect disability pension benefits in year t , they are

also classified as entering a sick leave in that year ($S_t = 1$). When modelling transitions from sick leave to disability retirement, employees A, C and D would be included in the risk set in year t , but not employee B who was out of work for an unknown reason.

4.4 Sample design for modelling transition rates

The transition probabilities (or rates) defined above are closely interrelated but not perfectly. Namely, it holds that

$$\Pr(D_t = 1) \geq \Pr(S_t = 1) \Pr(D_t = 1 | S_t = 1), \quad t = 1997, 1998, \dots, 2002,$$

where $\Pr(D_t = 1)$ denotes the likelihood of starting disability retirement (by the end of year $t + 2$) due to job withdrawal in year t , $\Pr(S_t = 1)$ is the likelihood of entering a sick leave in year t , and $\Pr(D_t = 1 | S_t = 1)$ is the likelihood that a sick leave starting in year t eventually lead to disability retirement. It should be stressed that employees whose working career was interrupted without receipt of sickness benefits in year t and who were granted a disability pension in year $t + 1$ or $t + 2$ contribute to the event on the left-hand side of the equation but not to the events on the right-hand side (e.g. person B in figure 2). As a result, the product of the two probabilities on the right-hand side is typically less than the overall disability probability on the left-hand side. Nevertheless, the product of $\Pr(S_t = 1)$ and $\Pr(D_t = 1 | S_t = 1)$ gives a useful decomposition for $\Pr(D_t = 1)$, although its approximate nature should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. By comparing the determinants of $\Pr(S_t = 1)$ and $\Pr(D_t = 1 | S_t = 1)$, we aim at making a distinction between the *ex ante* and *ex post* effects of the covariates of interest.

Our estimation samples include all employees who are at risk of making a transition of interest between the years 1997 and 2002. The sample period ends in 2002, because when detecting the timing of job withdrawals, we have to be able to follow employees at risk at least for the next two or three years. The period begins in 1997 because the FLEED covers all firms from the year 1994 onwards and we need firm records from the past three years to construct some control variables. Our samples are rotating panels, where in each year new employees enter the risk set while some old ones leave it.

4.5 Raw transition rates

Table 1 reports the sizes of the risk groups and the raw transition rates by age. All transition rates increase almost uniformly with age. The likelihood of a transition to sick leave doubles while the likelihood of being granted a disability pension triples from age 55 to 62. This is explained by the fact that employees are less likely to return to work from sick leave at older ages, as seen in the last column. The transition rate from sick leave to disability retirement is strikingly high at all ages; one-half of sickness benefit recipients aged 55 or 56 years and three in four of those older than 56 do not return to work but end up in disability retirement.

It is noteworthy that the size of the group at risk of entering a sick leave or becoming disabled declines rapidly with age. While the total number of employees at risk is about 61,000 at age 55, the group at risk halves by age 58 and includes only 8000 employees at age 62. A similar pattern is seen for the number of employees on sickness benefits. These

Table 1: Transition rates and the size of risk groups by age

Age	N	$\Pr(D = 1)$	$\Pr(S = 1)$	R	$\Pr(D = 1 S = 1)$
55	61,289	0.017	0.025	1,507	0.491
56	49,952	0.020	0.024	1,223	0.512
57	38,406	0.028	0.031	1,206	0.598
58	29,229	0.032	0.033	950	0.654
59	22,269	0.044	0.038	853	0.728
60	16,241	0.048	0.040	650	0.778
61	12,405	0.056	0.047	589	0.752
62	8,068	0.050	0.051	411	0.786
All	237,859	0.029	0.031	7,389	0.623

Notes: N is the size of the risk group for transitions to disability retirement and sick leave. R is the size of the risk group for transitions from sick leave to disability retirement. $\Pr(D=1)$ is the probability of a transition to disability retirement. $\Pr(S=1)$ is the probability of a transition to sick leave. $\Pr(D=1|S=1)$ is the probability of a transition to disability retirement conditional on being on sick leave.

declining age patterns reflect the fact that people tend to withdraw from employment quite early. In particular, it is rather common for private-sector employees to end up in long-term unemployment at older ages because employees aged 55 years (and 1 month) or older at the time of unemployment entry can collect earnings-related unemployment insurance benefits until retirement at age 60 via the unemployment pension scheme (see e.g. Kyyrä and Wilke, 2007).

Because of the experience rating system, variation in the transition rates across firms of different sizes is of particular interest. In table 2, employees are classified into four groups according to the size of their employer at the end of year $t - 1$. As seen in the last column, there are no systematic differences in the transition rates to sick leave or disability retirement in firms with 1000 or fewer employees. However, in the largest firms the transition rate to both sick leave and disability retirement is a quarter higher than in the smaller firms. The experience rating of disability pension expenditures, which devotes higher cost shares for larger firms, would have implied the opposite. Moreover, the transition rate from sick leave to disability retirement does not vary with firm size, giving no support for the *ex post* effect of experience rating.

There are reasons why disability and sick leave entries may be associated with current or past employment changes at the workplace. The past employment reductions can lead to added stress at the workplace, such as reduced control over one's chores and increased workload and job insecurity. This could cause health problems for those who kept their jobs (e.g. Vahtera *et al.*, 2005). Encouraging disability retirement of older employees can be a helpful strategy in downsizing and restructuring endeavours of a firm, suggesting that there might be a relationship between the current growth rate and disability incidence.⁹ Since the difficulties of laying off older employees probably vary with business conditions, the disability entry rates can also vary between downsizing and expansion periods.

⁹A recent study by Gielen and Van Ours (2006) analyzes age differences in job reallocation and labour mobility using matched worker-firm data for the Netherlands. They find that firms adjust their workforce mainly via entry for young and prime-age workers, but via separations for older workers. Furthermore, employment of old workers is found to be more responsive to firm-specific employment changes.

Table 2: Transition rates by firm size and establishment growth

Firm size	Establishment's growth category						All
	Past period from $t - 4$ to $t - 1$			Current period from $t - 1$ to $t + 2$			
	Contracting	Stable	Expanding	Contracting	Stable	Expanding	
From work to disability retirement, $\Pr(D = 1)$							
5-50	0.026	0.029	0.024	0.024	0.025	0.030	0.026
51-300	0.026	0.027	0.028	0.025	0.028	0.027	0.027
301-1000	0.023	0.028	0.027	0.024	0.028	0.026	0.027
> 1000	0.032	0.033	0.035	0.030	0.033	0.036	0.034
All	0.027	0.030	0.029	0.026	0.029	0.031	0.029
From work to sick leave, $\Pr(S = 1)$							
5-50	0.030	0.028	0.028	0.026	0.029	0.031	0.029
51-300	0.026	0.028	0.030	0.027	0.029	0.029	0.028
301-1000	0.027	0.031	0.028	0.026	0.032	0.028	0.029
> 1000	0.038	0.035	0.037	0.032	0.037	0.038	0.036
All	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.028	0.032	0.032	0.031
From sick leave to disability retirement, $\Pr(D = 1 S = 1)$							
5-50	0.636	0.668	0.585	0.632	0.621	0.633	0.628
51-300	0.659	0.629	0.632	0.620	0.641	0.635	0.635
301-1000	0.578	0.601	0.628	0.651	0.589	0.603	0.605
> 1000	0.591	0.634	0.620	0.658	0.602	0.637	0.622
All	0.615	0.632	0.614	0.640	0.611	0.630	0.623

Notes: Establishments were divided into contracting, stable and growing ones according to 3-year growth rates from $t-4$ to $t-1$ and from $t-1$ to $t+2$. In contracting establishments the growth rate was below -0.1 , in stable ones between $[-0.1, 0.15)$ and in growing ones greater or equal to 0.15 .

To address these questions we examine the relationship between the transition probabilities and the past and current growth rates of employment. The growth rates are measured over three-year periods to smooth out annual noise in employment variation, and because retirement decisions are hardly based on yearly variation. Following the job and worker flow literature, we define the growth rate as $\Delta e_{t,s}/\bar{e}_{t,s}$, where $\Delta e_{t,s}$ is the employment change from year t to year s in a given establishment, and $\bar{e}_{t,s}$ is the average employment level in years t and s . The growth rates defined in this way can take values on the interval $[-2, 2]$. Employment is measured by the number of employees in the establishment at the end of the year. Since employees at risk in year t were by construction all still employed at the end of year $t - 1$, the past growth rate is computed over the period from year $t - 4$ to year $t - 1$. With the current growth rate we refer to the employment change from year $t - 1$ to year $t + 2$, as the possible transition to disability retirement must take place by the end of year $t + 2$.

We believe that labour demand conditions are best described by employment changes in the establishment for those who are employed in large firms with multiple establishments. So we consider employment variation at establishment level, even though we control the size of the personnel at firm level. In table 2, employees are further divided into groups

according to the past and current growth rate of the establishment at which they worked at the end of year $t - 1$. Establishments whose growth rate lies on the interval $[-0.10, 0.15)$ are labelled to be 'stable' as opposed to contracting and expanding ones.

First of all, note that our finding that the transition rates to sick leave and disability retirement are highest for the employees of firms with over 1000 employees holds also when we are conditioning on the past or current employment growth category. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the transition rates does seem to be sensitive with respect to past or current growth rates. Differences in the transition rates between employees at contracting, expanding and stable establishments are generally very small, and do not exhibit consistent patterns. These results should not be taken as conclusive, however, since it is possible that compositional differences in the older workforce across firms of different size, and establishments in different growth categories mask the underlying true relationships.

5 Determinants of transition rates

We apply pooled-data logit models to study the determinants of the transition rates. The results from our baseline specification for individual-specific and employer-specific covariates are shown in tables 3 and 4, respectively. We report the odds ratios for dummy variables and the marginal effects for all covariates along with standard errors that are robust to clustering to account for correlation across individuals working in the same establishment. The marginal effects are computed for an average person of the risk group.¹⁰ We begin our discussion with the effects of some individual characteristics, and then we proceed to the effects of the covariates of primary interest, including firm size, growth rates, employer's financial position, and strictness of the medical criteria.

5.1 Individual characteristics

As seen in table 3, the transition rate to sick leave and disability retirement increases strongly with age. For example, the likelihood of entering a sick leave is 1.7 percentage points higher at age 62 than at age 55. The difference in the likelihood of becoming disabled is almost the same, being 1.8 percentage points. These are relatively large increases as the general level of the transition rates is rather low. The average probabilities of entries into sick leave and disability retirement are around 2.5% and 2.3% per year, respectively, as shown in table 4. Interestingly, the effect of age on the transition rate from sick leave to disability retirement is quite different. While differences in the transition rate are statistically insignificant until age 57 or 58, there is a discrete increase of about 1.3 percentage points close to age 60.

Women are less likely to move into sick leave and more likely to return to work from sick leave, leading to a lower transition rate to disability retirement. This finding is in line with women's lower incidence of disability in figure 1. The likelihood of being granted a disability pension decreases uniformly with education. The odds of becoming a disability

¹⁰The risk group for transitions from sick leave to disability retirement is different compared with that for other transitions, and thereby the marginal effects are evaluated at the different values of the covariates. This does not, however, alter our interpretation of covariate effects.

Table 3: Odds ratios and marginal effects for individual-specific covariates from baseline logit models

	Probability of a transition to					
	Disability		Sick leave		Db from sick	
	Odds	M-eff.	Odds	M-eff.	Odds	M-eff.
Relaxed medical criteria ¹⁾	1.625	0.011	1.227	0.005	1.614	0.109
	(0.106)	(0.002)	(0.064)	(0.001)	(0.180)	(0.025)
1(sickness benefits > 0 at $t - 2$)	1.912	0.020	2.125	0.026	0.901	-0.024
	(0.124)	(0.003)	(0.129)	(0.003)	(0.116)	(0.030)
Sickness benefit share ²⁾ at $t - 2$		0.030		0.020		<i>0.362</i>
		(0.009)		(0.010)		(0.207)
1(sickness benefits > 0 at $t - 3$)	1.989	0.021	2.218	0.028	1.031	0.007
	(0.114)	(0.002)	(0.112)	(0.002)	(0.104)	(0.023)
1(sickness benefits > 0 at $t - 4$)	1.561	0.012	1.747	0.018	0.923	-0.019
	(0.100)	(0.002)	(0.099)	(0.002)	(0.095)	(0.024)
Age 56	1.203	0.004	1.002	0.000	1.070	0.015
	(0.056)	(0.001)	(0.040)	(0.001)	(0.089)	(0.019)
Age 57	1.169	0.004	1.130	0.003	1.067	0.015
	(0.078)	(0.002)	(0.055)	(0.001)	(0.109)	(0.023)
Age 58	1.292	0.006	1.186	0.004	<i>1.249</i>	<i>0.050</i>
	(0.095)	(0.002)	(0.066)	(0.002)	(0.151)	(0.026)
Age 59	1.645	0.014	1.310	0.007	1.519	0.091
	(0.135)	(0.003)	(0.090)	(0.002)	(0.233)	(0.031)
Age 60	1.799	0.017	1.404	0.009	1.839	0.127
	(0.149)	(0.003)	(0.100)	(0.002)	(0.297)	(0.030)
Age 61	2.037	0.022	1.526	0.012	1.888	0.132
	(0.176)	(0.004)	(0.116)	(0.003)	(0.329)	(0.032)
Age 62	1.811	0.018	1.705	0.017	1.983	0.140
	(0.168)	(0.004)	(0.136)	(0.003)	(0.368)	(0.033)
Female	0.779	-0.005	0.893	-0.003	0.610	-0.114
	(0.025)	(0.001)	(0.027)	(0.001)	(0.041)	(0.016)
High school	0.934	-0.002	0.955	-0.001	0.984	-0.004
	(0.026)	(0.001)	(0.028)	(0.001)	(0.058)	(0.014)
Lowest tertiary	0.555	-0.012	0.658	-0.008	1.035	0.008
	(0.025)	(0.001)	(0.031)	(0.001)	(0.110)	(0.024)
Bachelor	0.420	-0.015	0.493	-0.012	1.102	0.022
	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.035)	(0.001)	(0.184)	(0.037)
Master's or higher	0.338	-0.017	0.414	-0.014	1.157	0.033
	(0.034)	(0.001)	(0.041)	(0.001)	(0.288)	(0.054)
Foreign language	<i>0.735</i>	<i>-0.006</i>	0.536	-0.011	<i>0.589</i>	-0.128
	(0.128)	(0.003)	(0.110)	(0.003)	(0.244)	(0.104)
Wage position ²⁾		-0.008		-0.007		-0.001
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.025)
Spouse working	0.919	-0.002	0.987	0.000	1.097	0.021
	(0.026)	(0.001)	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.067)	(0.014)
Spouse retired	1.195	0.005	1.315	0.007	1.351	0.067
	(0.039)	(0.001)	(0.044)	(0.001)	(0.101)	(0.016)

Notes: The models also include controls for industry, living region, and tenure. The reference employee is a 55-year-old single man who has completed only basic education, speaks Finnish or Swedish as his mother tongue, and worked at the end of year $t-1$ in an establishment with no more than 50 employees. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significantly non-unit odds ratios and non-zero marginal effects in **bold** (95%-confidence level) or in *italics* (90%-confidence level). 1) Dummy for those who may be granted an IER pension by the end of year t . 2) The share of sickness benefits of taxable labour income. 3) Employee's position in the establishment's wage distribution, ranging from 0 for the lowest wage to 1 for the highest wage.

pension recipient is 0.34 for an employee with a Master’s degree or higher compared with an otherwise similar employee with a basic education, which corresponds to a 1.7 percentage points lower annual risk of becoming disabled. This difference is of the same size as the effect of an increase in age from 55 to 60. Education has no effect on the likelihood of returning to work from sick leave. Hence, the lower risk of disability for the educated people is explained by their lower transition rates to sick leave.

Employees holding better jobs at the workplace, as measured by their position in the wage distribution, are less likely to end up on sick leave and, consequently, disability retirement. Family background also matters. Compared with singles, employees whose spouse is still working have a slightly lower probability of being granted a disability pension. It appears that employees with a retired spouse are the most likely to enter sick leave and the least likely to return to work from sick leave. This may indicate that employees with a retired spouse value their leisure time more than the other groups. Alternatively, their spouses may require special attention at home if they suffer from health problems.

Unfortunately, our data do not contain directed measures of health. To approximate health history we exploit information on the amount of sickness benefits collected in the past years. By construction, the employee at risk in year t did not receive sickness benefits in year $t - 1$. For year $t - 2$ we add a dummy variable indicating whether the employee received sickness benefits, as well as the share of sickness benefits of taxable labour income as a proxy for the fraction of the time spent on sick leave during that year.¹¹ For the next two years, we also add dummy variables indicating receipt of sickness benefits. Not surprisingly, receipt of sickness benefits in the past increases the transition rates to sick leave and to disability retirement. Having been on sick leave in year $t - 2$ raises the likelihood of becoming disabled at least by 0.2 percentage points, the overall effect depending on the time spent on sickness benefits. Conditional on being on sick leave, past sickness history has hardly any effect on the likelihood of being granted a disability pension. Only the share of sickness benefits in year $t - 2$ has a positive effect, but it is inaccurately estimated, being statistically significant only at the 10% risk level.

5.2 Strictness of medical criteria

In 2000, the IER retirement scheme was removed from all private-sector employees who were born in 1944 or later. Given a relatively low emphasis on medical factors when determining eligibility for IER pensions, this reform can be viewed as an increase in the stringency of medical screening for the disability status. The oldest affected employees were 56 years old at the time of the reform and hence below the pre-reform age threshold of 58. This rules out anticipation behaviour towards IER pensions, providing us with a quasi-experimental setting for evaluating the impact of the medical criteria. More specifically, we exploit the change in the eligibility criteria by adding a dummy variable for employees born before 1944 who were at least 57 years old at the end of year $t - 1$ to our models (*Relaxed medical criteria* in table 3). This group of employees can potentially qualify for

¹¹This is not an accurate measure because the waiting time until the receipt of sickness benefits from KELA can vary between employees, and because the amount of a sickness benefit is determined as a decreasing fraction of the past earnings.

IER pension benefits by the end of year t , so that their disability pension applications are subject to the less strict medical assessment compared with all other employees.

Being eligible to apply for an IER pension clearly raises all three transition rates. The odds ratio of entering a sick leave is 1.2, implying a 0.5 percentage point higher transition rate to sick leave for an employee who can apply for an IER pension benefit than for an otherwise similar non-eligible employee. Conditional on being on sickness benefits, the IER pension scheme increases the likelihood of being granted a disability pension by 11 percentage points. Overall, the probability of moving to the disability pension track is 1.1 percentage points higher for employees with an option to apply for an IER pension. Our results are in accordance with Börsch-Supan's (2007) conclusion that the strictness by which vocational considerations (at the expense of medical criteria) are applied when determining eligibility for disability pension benefits is strongly related to disability pension incidence.

We also estimated model variants where the effect of relaxed medical criteria was allowed to vary across firms of different size. The effect was found to be essentially the same in all the size categories, even though one might expect to find some variation resulting from possible interactions with the experience rating system. Moreover, we tried to detect differential effects at different ages, but did not find notable variation across age groups.

5.3 Firm's size and financial position

Next we turn to the firm characteristics that are supposed to be closely related to the experience-rated contributions: firm size and equity ratio. The former determines the degree of experience rating, whereas the latter describes the firm's ability to incur disability pension costs. The models include three dummy variables for the size of the employing firm at the end of year $t - 1$. The smallest firms with 5 to 50 employees, which are not subject to the experience-rated contributions, serve as the reference category.

As seen in table 4, the likelihood of a transition from work to sick leave increases weakly with firm size, being significantly higher only for the largest firms. Namely, an employee of a firm with over 1000 employees has a 0.8 percentage point higher risk of entering sick leave per year than an otherwise similar person in a firm with 50 or fewer employees. In fact, we should have found a negative association if the experience-rated firms put more effort in preventive measures to minimize their employees' flow into sick leave (i.e. the *ex ante* effect of experience rating). In the large firms many people are doing similar work, making it easier to share the job tasks of a sick person between the remaining employees. This may induce the employees of large firms to apply for sickness benefits more frequently, which could explain our finding.

There is no evidence of a significant relationship between firm size and the overall risk of ending up with a disability pension. It is noteworthy, however, that the likelihood of disability retirement conditional on being a recipient of sickness benefits decreases with the firm size. For the employees of the two largest employer groups, the odds ratios are about 0.6 and 0.7, corresponding to decreases of 13 and 9 percentage points in the disability probability for the average recipient of sickness benefits. These relatively large estimates

Table 4: Odds ratios and marginal effects for employer-specific covariates from baseline logit models

	Probability of a transition to					
	Disability		Sick leave		Db from sick	
	Odds	M-eff.	Odds	M-eff.	Odds	M-eff.
Equity ratio ¹⁾		<i>0.003</i>		-0.002		0.101
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.033)
Past employment growth from $t - 4$ to $t - 1$		-0.001		0.000		-0.018
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.021)
Recent employment growth from $t - 1$ to $t + 2$		0.003		0.002		0.007
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.018)
Past excess worker turnover from $t - 4$ to $t - 1$		-0.009		-0.006		-0.020
		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.056)
Recent excess worker turnover from $t - 1$ to $t + 2$		0.017		0.015		0.156
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.057)
<i>Log</i> (turnover)		0.000		0.000		<i>0.013</i>
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.007)
Establishment closure at t	0.939	-0.001	0.756	-0.006	4.008	0.234
	(0.220)	(0.005)	(0.151)	(0.004)	(2.402)	(0.064)
Firm size 51–300	1.005	0.000	1.072	0.002	<i>0.849</i>	-0.038
	(0.056)	(0.001)	(0.055)	(0.001)	(0.092)	(0.025)
Firm size 301–1000	0.916	-0.002	1.121	0.003	0.588	-0.127
	(0.079)	(0.002)	(0.084)	(0.002)	(0.097)	(0.040)
Firm size > 1000	1.135	0.003	1.356	0.008	0.685	<i>-0.088</i>
	(0.116)	(0.002)	(0.123)	(0.002)	(0.137)	(0.047)
Mean age of employees		<i>0.000</i>		0.000		0.005
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.002)
N observations	237,859		237,859		7,389	
$\Pr(Y)$ at $\text{mean}(X)$		0.023		0.025		0.646
N establishments	23,553		23,553		4,127	
Pseudo R^2	0.054		0.055		0.141	

Notes: The models also include controls for industry, living region and tenure. The reference employee is a 55-year-old single man who has completed only basic education, speaks Finnish or Swedish as his mother tongue, and worked at the end of year $t-1$ in an establishment with no more than 50 employees. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significantly non-unit odds ratios and non-zero marginal effects in **bold** (95%-confidence level) or in *italics* (90%-confidence level). 1) Equity as share of assets (bottom coded below the 5th percentile and top coded above 95th percentile).

give some support for the existence of the *ex post* effect of experience rating, that is, the firms subject to experience rating put more effort in occupational rehabilitation to get their employees on sickness benefits back to work in order to avoid the disability pension costs. On the other hand, the estimates may be related to the higher transition rate to sick leave for the large firms if their employees are more prone to apply for sickness benefits. Our findings may also be driven by a 'true' size effect, which can result if the larger firms have better possibilities to organize retraining and arrange alternative job tasks for their employees with reduced working capacity.

We tried to distinguish between these competing explanations by exploiting the change in the experience-rated contributions in 2000 that reduced the cost share of firms with over 800 employees. We first included the interaction term for employees in the affected firm size category and the post-reform period. Then we added the cost share as an additional covariate along with controls for firm size to an alternative specification. Neither of these two exercises produced significant coefficients for the experience rating variables. This may not be very surprising given that the change in the cost shares in 2000 was rather small. In our view, the reform in 2000 did not yield sufficient variation in the cost shares for reliable identification in the quasi-experimental setting. So we can interpret our firm size effects as evidence of the *ex post* effect of experience rating on the transition rate from sick leave to disability only under fairly strong assumptions.

Since experience rating aims to affect employer behaviour through financial incentives, the effectiveness of such incentives should depend on the firm's financial position. When the experience-rated firm is short of liquid assets, it might try harder to deter exits to disability retirement to avoid the costs that in a dire financial situation might bankrupt the firm. This is a relevant concern especially in the Finnish system where the employer has to pay its share of the expected future disability pension costs as a lump-sum payment at the time when a disability pension is granted to its employee. To address this question we use the equity ratio as a proxy for a firm's financial position.¹² In table 4, the equity ratio has a positive effect on the likelihood that a sick leave will be followed by a disability pension. Hence, a recipient of sickness benefits in a firm in a weak financial position returns to work with a relatively high probability. Also the overall probability of a transition to disability retirement increases with the equity ratio, although the marginal effect of 0.003 is of modest absolute value and statistically significant only at the 10% risk level.

Given that the experience-rated contributions depend on firm size, we should expect the effect of the equity ratio to vary across firms of different size. We therefore extend our baseline specification by adding interaction terms of firm size categories and equity ratio. The results of this exercise are shown in table 5. There is no evidence of statistically significant effects in the smallest firms that are not subject to experience rating, which is consistent with the claim that the effect of the equity ratio is attributable to the experience rating system. We do not find statistically significant effects in the second smallest size category either. Although experience rating is applied to these firms, their share of

¹²There are a few extreme values for the equity ratio. To deal with such outliers we bottom and top coded the equity ratio at the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively. That is, we use the threshold values for observations below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile. As a result, the range of variation shrank from $[-8.24, 2.50]$ to $[0.08, 0.82]$.

Table 5: Marginal effects for equity ratio by firm size

Equity ratio ¹⁾ for group	Probability of a transition to		
	Disability	Sick leave	Dd from sick
Firm size 5–50	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.031 (0.054)
Firm size 51–300	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.020 (0.056)
Firm size 301–1000	0.011 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.119 (0.101)
Firm size > 1000	0.011 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.296 (0.072)

Notes: Other covariates as in the baseline specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significantly non-zero marginal effects in **bold** (95%-confidence level) or in *italics* (90%-confidence level). 1) Equity as share of assets (bottom coded below the 5th percentile and top coded above 95th percentile).

disability pension expenditures is rather small, perhaps too small to be effective.

In firms that employ more than 300 employees, the likelihood of being granted a disability pension increases with the equity ratio. The marginal effects in the first column are found to be of the same size in the two largest firm size groups. In the case of the largest firms, the likelihood of being granted a disability pension for a recipient of sickness benefits increases clearly with the equity ratio: an increase of ten percentage points in the equity ratio is related to a three percentage point increase in the disability pension incidence. Put differently, large firms that can afford the cost of disability pension expenditures seem to put less effort into occupational rehabilitation compared with large firms in a weaker economic position. The marginal effect of 0.119 for the second largest firm group is also relatively large but inaccurately estimated, and thereby statistically insignificant at the conventional risk levels.

In sum, our findings about the effects of firm size, financial position and their interaction give some support for the hypothesis that experience rating affects employer behaviour. The lower transition rate from sick leave to disability retirement for the larger firms is consistent with the hypothesis of the *ex post* effect. But, without notable exogenous variation in the experience-rated contributions, this evidence alone is not very convincing. Our results for the effect of the equity ratio give further support for the existence of experience rating effects. Namely, the financial position of a firm has an effect on the employees of the larger firms that are liable for a significant fraction of disability pension expenditure of their former employees, whereas we find no relationship between the equity ratio and transition rates in the firms that are not subject to (a notable degree of) experience rating.

5.4 Employment growth and excess turnover

Our models include a control variable for excess worker turnover, which measures the degree of restructuring at the workplace for a given net change in employment.¹³ Excess worker turnover can be either voluntary or involuntary from the employees' standpoint. It may result from the restructuring measures through which the employer adjusts the structure of the workforce. Or it may be driven by a high level of voluntary quits, perhaps induced by poor working conditions, management or wage rates, which are compensated by new hires.

As seen in table 4, employees in the establishments with high current levels of excess worker turnover are more likely to enter a sick leave and less likely to return to work from sick leave. Consequently, exits via disability retirement are more common in workplaces with a high rate of excess worker turnover. It should be noted that the effect of excess worker turnover is conditional on a given change in the employment level, as we control the employment growth rates. High turnover can result in extra training work for the tenured employees and cause other problems at the workplace, and thereby lead to an increase in stress factors. When high turnover reflects an ongoing restructuring process, our estimates suggest the possibility that the employer encourages some older employees to apply for a disability pension. For an employer that is adjusting the structure of the workforce but is not downsizing, such a policy can be an effective alternative for dismissals that would be difficult to justify.

Interestingly, the effect of excess worker turnover over the past three years has an opposite effect on the transition rates to sick leave and disability retirement, while it does not affect transitions from sick leave to disability retirement. The restructuring measures may improve the working conditions with some delay. If this is the case, the past measures can decrease the current transition rate to sick leave.

In table 4, none of the effects of the employment change during the past three years differ statistically significantly from zero. By contrast, the employment growth over the next three years affects the transition rates to sick leave and disability retirement. Compared with employees at the stable workplaces, the employees of growing establishments are more likely to enter a sick leave and to exit via a disability pension scheme. This may result from difficulties to use dismissals to adjust the structure of the workforce at growing establishments. When the growth rate is negative, i.e. the establishment is cutting its employment, transitions to sick leave and disability retirement become less frequent. The magnitude of the effect of the current growth rate is rather small, however. For example, being employed in an establishment whose workforce increases by one-half by the end of year $t + 2$ (i.e. the growth rate of 0.4) increases the probability of being granted a disability pension by 0.12 percentage points ($= 0.4 \times 0.003 \times 100$) compared with the case of

¹³Excess worker turnover in year t is defined as $h_t + s_t - |\Delta e_t|$, where h_t and s_t denote the number of hires and separations during year t , respectively, and Δe_t is the employment change from the end of year $t - 1$ to the end of year t in a given establishment. This quantity is the worker flow in excess of what is needed to explain the net change in the size of establishment's workforce. Dividing it by the average employment level at the end of years $t - 1$ and t , say \bar{e}_t , gives the excess turnover rate: $(h_t + s_t - |\Delta e_t|)/\bar{e}_t$, which takes a value on the interval $[0, 2]$. To smooth annual variation we take the average of the excess turnover rates between years $t - 4$ and $t - 1$ (for the past period) and between years t and $t + 2$ (for the current period) which are then used as covariates in our models.

Table 6: Marginal effects for employment growth rates from extended logit models

	Probability of a transition to		
	Disability	Sick leave	Db from sick
Past growth from $t - 4$ to $t - 1$			
when ≥ 0	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.008 (0.029)
when < 0	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	<i>-0.096</i> (0.051)
Recent growth from $t - 1$ to $t + 2$			
when ≥ 0	0.002 (0.001)	<i>0.002</i> (0.001)	-0.023 (0.022)
when < 0	0.006 (0.002)	<i>0.004</i> (0.002)	0.113 (0.049)

Notes: Other covariates as in the baseline specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significantly (95%-confidence level) non-zero marginal effects in **bold**. 90%-confidence level indicated with *italics*.

working in a stable establishment.

The underlying assumption of symmetric effects for the expansion and contraction of the workforce is quite restrictive. In table 6 we therefore report results from model specifications that do not impose such a restriction but allow for different coefficients for positive and negative growth rates. The risk of being granted a disability pension remains lower for those holding jobs in establishments that are currently downsizing, but this effect is now stronger. The marginal effect of the current decline in employment on the probability of disability pension receipt is 0.006, and increases to 0.113 if the employee is already on sickness benefits. Thus, a 50% decrease in the workforce over the next three years (i.e. the growth rate of -0.67) is estimated to reduce the disability pension entry rate by 0.4 percentage points among all employees and by 7.6 percentage points among the recipients of sickness benefits, compared with the case of no change in the workforce. One possible explanation is that employees with health problems are less willing to apply for sick leave and those already on sickness benefits return to work more easily at the times when they are worried about their jobs. During slack demand employers may also use dismissals to get rid of employees with reduced working capacity before they apply for a sickness benefit or disability pension. Furthermore, it turns out that the estimated effects of the employment increases on the transition rates to sick leave and disability retirement are close to the estimates obtained from the baseline specification in table 4. Note that an expansion in the size of the workforce increases the transition rates clearly less than contraction of the same size decreases it.

Black *et al.* (2002) find that negative (positive) demand shocks increase (decrease) the entry rate to disability benefit schemes in aggregate US data. We have just shown that the reverse relationship holds at the establishment level in the Finnish labour market. This is partly due to the fact that we are considering only transitions from work to disability retirement. During economic downturns, transitions from nonparticipation and unemployment to disability schemes are likely to increase, and such transitions probably

dominate the US data. Nevertheless, it is important to address the issue why employers may actively encourage early retirement when growing or when restructuring without notable employment reductions.

Employees are protected against unjustified dismissals by the law. To dismiss someone, the employer needs to show that the employee has failed to perform his tasks or his job has become redundant. It follows that, when the establishment is not downsizing, dismissals are difficult to justify and thereby early retirement via disability schemes can be a helpful strategy. Moreover, when new hires follow recent dismissals, the firm is obligated to rehire its former employees if the job tasks are similar. A consequence is that the employer cannot easily replace dismissed employees with new ones. This is a particularly relevant issue for the older employees who tend to remain unemployed for a long time after job loss. The employer may try to overcome this problem by inducing early retirement.

Also, the more flexible specification suggests that employment change during the past three-year period has little effect on the disability and sickness outcomes. The only statistically significant effect (at the 10% risk level) is found for recipients of sickness benefits in contracting establishments. They are less likely to return to work from sick leave or, equivalently, more likely to end up in disability pension benefits. Our findings differ from the results of Vahtera *et al.* (2005) and Rege *et al.* (in press), who found that a large reduction of the workforce in the past leads to a notable increase in the entry rate to disability retirement. First of all, it is possible that our results are sensitive to the assumed linear form for the effect of employment changes in our model. To check the robustness of our results with respect to this restriction, we also estimated model variants where the linear growth rates were replaced with a set of dummy variables for employment changes of different size. We did not find evidence of statistically significant increases in the disability pension entry rates following past mass layoffs either – on the contrary, the largest layoff categories were associated with negative marginal effects. On the other hand, our research design is quite different. The risk set of Rege *et al.* also includes those who lost their job as a result of plant downsizing. Vahtera *et al.* consider only employed workers but their data come from the municipal sector and cover an exceptional period of deep recession.

6 Concluding remarks

In this study we analyzed how labour demand and institutional factors affect transitions to sick leave and disability retirement. Using matched employer-employee data for the Finnish private sector, we were able to measure the employment growth rates and excess worker turnover at the establishment level. To study the role of the institutional setting, we exploited the law change that affected the medical requirements for disability pension eligibility and the partially experience-rated employer contributions. Our main findings can be summarized as follows:

- For older employees a transition to sick leave is often a one-way street out of employment, leading eventually to disability retirement. Some two-thirds of the 55-62 year olds who are on sickness benefits end up in disability retirement within the

next three years. This highlights the importance of preventive measures aimed at minimizing the flow into sick leave.

- Those employees who can apply for a disability pension under more lenient medical requirements are much more likely to enter a sick leave and to exit via disability retirement. Therefore, the abolition of the individual early retirement scheme in 2000 effectively reduced the flow into disability retirement among older people born in 1944 or later.
- There is no evidence that experience rating would affect the flow into sick leave (i.e. the *ex ante* effect). By contrast, experience rating appears to reduce transitions from sick leave to disability retirement. Evidence of this *ex post* effect is twofold. First, recipients of sickness benefits in the large firms that are responsible for a notable part of disability pension costs are less likely to end up in disability pension benefits. Second, the large firms that can easily incur their share of early retirement costs due to a strong financial position let their employees on sickness benefits exit more easily via disability pension schemes than firms in a weaker position do. Financial situation does not matter for the smaller firms that are not subject to experience rating or whose cost share is relatively low.
- The transition rates to sick leave and disability retirement are relatively large in establishments that are growing or experiencing a high degree of excess worker turnover. This suggests that employers induce exits to disability retirement as an alternative to dismissals at times when it would be difficult to lay off employees. When the establishment is downsizing, transitions to sick leave and disability retirement become less frequent. Thus, during slack demand, either employees apply less easily for sick leave or employers target dismissals at those employees with reduced working capacity due to health problems. Unlike some other studies, we find that past employment reduction has hardly any effect on the current transition rate.

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