

Takeshi Nishimura

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FY2012 Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Research Fellow

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Fields: Game Theory, Auction Theory, Contract Theory, Industrial Organization

Research Interests: Economic Analysis of Procurement Mechanisms

Dissertation Title: “Economic Analysis of Procurement” (tentative)

Education

Ph.D. in Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2014 (expected)

M.A. in Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2009

B.A. in Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2003

Experience

2011 – present Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Research Fellow,
Hitotsubashi University Global Centers of Excellence (COE) Program
“Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social
Sciences”

2010 – 2011 COE Young Researcher, Hitotsubashi University Global COE Program
“Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social
Sciences”

2003 – 2005 Associate Consultant, IBM Business Consulting Services K.K., Tokyo,
Japan

Publications

“Optimal Design of Scoring Auction with Multidimensional Quality”, Hitotsubashi
University Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series, no. 238, 2012.

“Bundling Decision in Procurement Auctions with Risk-Averse Suppliers”, Hitotsubashi
University Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series, no. 237, 2012.

“Scoring Auction by an Informed Principal”, Hitotsubashi University Global COE Hi-Stat
Discussion Paper Series, no. 224, 2011.

“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with a Risk-Averse Agent”, Hitotsubashi

University Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series, no. 165, 2010.

“Analysis of Contracts in the Software Industry” (in Japanese, with Fumitoshi Moriya, Toshihiro Tsuchihashi, Shigeru Takahashi, and Hiromi Nakamura), *SEC Journal*, vol. 5, no. 6, December 2009: 362-367.

Conference Presentations

“Scoring Auction by an Informed Principal,” GAMES 2012, Bilgi University, July 23, 2012.

“Optimal Design of Scoring Auction,” ISER Seminar Series, Osaka University, May 9, 2012.

“Optimal Design of Scoring Auction,” Nagoya University Workshop, Nagoya University, April 20, 2012.

“Optimal Design of Scoring Auction,” Game Theory Workshop 2012, Shizuoka University, March 7, 2012.

“Optimal Design of Scoring Auction,” Kansai Game Theory Seminar, Konan University, February 25, 2012.

“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with a Risk-Averse Agent,” 2011 Asian Meeting of Econometric Society, Korea University, August 11, 2011.

“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with a Risk-Averse Agent,” Hitotsubashi G-COE Lectures and Workshop on Choice, Games, and Welfare, Hitotsubashi University, October 24, 2010.

“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with a Risk-Averse Agent,” The 16th Decentralization Conference, Kwansai Gakuin University, September 17, 2010.

“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with Risk-Averse Agent,” Contract Theory Workshop, Niigata University, August 5, 2010.

“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with Risk-Averse Agent,” Contract Theory Workshop East (CTWE), Hitotsubashi University, June 11, 2010.

“Incomplete Procurement Contracting with Risk-Averse Agent,” Kansai Game Theory Seminar, Toyama International Conference Center, May 22, 2010.

“Risk Sharing and Incentives in Multi-Stage Procurement: Theory and Case-Studies of the Japanese Software Industry,” Kansai Game Theory Seminar, Hiroshima University of Economics, October 24, 2009.

“Short-Term Versus Long-Term Contracts in Procurement: Theory and Case-Studies of Japanese Customized Software Industry,” Contract Theory Workshop: Summer Conference in Hokkaido 2009, Hokkaido University, August 7, 2009.

References

Professor Akira Okada

Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University

Professor Reiko Aoki

Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University